Those whom the gods will destroy they first make mad. Critics of Barack Obama’s Iran deal have been giving a good impression of having lost the plot. An Israeli cabinet minister described it as “one of the darkest days in world history”. Republicans liken Mr Obama to Neville Chamberlain. All agree that a deal that removes about two-thirds of Iran’s nuclear capability and freezes the rest will somehow hasten the day it has the bomb. In the next two months, before Capitol Hill votes on it, we will hear a lot more such bombast. It comes down to whether Congress believes Iran is capable of acting rationally or whether it is a uniquely malevolent country that has outfoxed America and its partners in the negotiating chamber.
The chances are that Mr Obama’s deal will prevail. He needs the veto-proof support of just a third of each chamber — 34 senators and 145 in the House of Representatives. Even then, however, it is no sure bet. In the next 60 days it will face the onslaught of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and every Republican presidential hopeful. In addition to viewing Iran in an apocalyptic light, each has further motives for wishing to sink the deal.
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the logic is simple. Iran is Saudi Arabia’s chief competitor that claims to speak for the region’s Shia minority, a large chunk of which lives in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich east. In a sectarian zero-sum game, anything that boosts Iran is bad.
Israel’s opposition is also straightforward. As the region’s only nuclear weapons state — albeit an undeclared one — it wants to keep its monopoly. The fact that the deal would set back Iran’s breakout capacity from two months to a year is false comfort, say the Israelis. By bringing a pariah state in from the cold, it will perversely raise the chances Iran eventually goes nuclear.
Finally, Republicans see Mr Obama as a feckless president who is jeopardising US power simply by talking to a terrorist state. The quality of the deal is irrelevant. Nothing short of regime change will do. Some of these motives overlap. For example, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, shares the Republican party’s personal animus towards Mr Obama. What unites them is a refusal to see Iran as capable of change.
Mr Obama has taken the opposite tack. A realistic negotiator puts himself into his adversary’s shoes. The starting point on Iran is that its desire to go nuclear is entirely rational. US-led coalitions have invaded two of Iran’s direct neighbours, Iraq and Afghanistan in the past 15 years. American troops are still there. As a rule, the US does not invade countries that have nuclear weapons. Moreover, the US labelled Iran part of the “axis of evil” in 2002, at a time when Tehran wanted to help the US in Afghanistan, where they shared enmity with the Taliban (as they still do). Mohammad Khatami, the moderate cleric who was then Iran’s president, had also signalled a nuclear deal was possible. Had President George W Bush responded, a far better one would have been available. Instead, he branded Iran evil. Unsurprisingly, Tehran stepped up its clandestine efforts.
Second, Iran’s decision to mothball its nuclear ambitions in exchange for economic relief is also rational. It is unlikely to give up on it lightly. It followed a decade’s worth of US-led sanctions that has brought the country’s economy to its knees. The regime of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, supreme leader, clearly thinks it will help its chances of survival.
It is possible, as Mr Obama’s critics predict, that Iran will spend much of the estimated $100bn in unfrozen assets on regional proxies — Hizbollah at the forefront. So what? Compared to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isis) and its mimics, Hizbollah is a restrained actor. Its theology is absolutist and it has carried out terrorist attacks. But it is not a death cult. In a world of bad choices, boosting Hizbollah’s clout is an acceptable price to pay for a deal that delays — and possibly dispels — the spectre of a Middle East nuclear arms race.
None of this cuts much ice with Mr Obama’s critics. Yet his detractors offer no realistic alternatives. Many Republican candidates are promising to rescind the Iran deal on “day one” of their presidency. Diplomatic norms prevent Mr Obama from pointing out that Iran is a more promising candidate for peaceful change than Saudi Arabia. Unlike that country, Iran has a quasi-democracy. About half of its university graduates are female. There are competing power centres within Iran’s theological regime. Prospects for further relaxation are easy to imagine. By contrast, the House of Saud rests on brittle foundations. Who dares guess what would come after it? Iran is a natural counterbalance to Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi theocracy. As a non-Arab country, it is incapable of dominating the Middle East. There is also the small matter of how to defeat Isis. Without Iran’s help, the US would be in far worse straits.
There are moments when US presidents take risks that alter the world as we know it. Ronald Reagan’s friendship with Mikhail Gorbachev is one instance. Richard Nixon’s opening to China is another. Mr Obama’s deal with Iran is almost as breathtaking in its scope.
天主欲使其消亡，必先使其猖狂。美國總統巴拉克攠巴馬(Barack Obama)與伊朗核協定的批駁者給人一種損失理智的猛烈感到。以色列一名內閣部長稱其為“天下汗青上最陰郁的日子之一”。共和黨人則將奧巴馬比作內維爾張伯倫(Neville Chamberlain，二戰前對納粹德國實施綏靖政策的英國輔弼——譯者註)。全部人都以為，一個清除伊朗約莫三分之二的核才能、凍結其他核舉措措施的協定，將以某種方法加速伊朗具有核兵器的那一天光降。在美國國會就該協定投票以前的將來兩個月裏，咱們還會聽到大批此類的誇狂言辭。這歸根到底要看國會是不是信任伊朗可以或許理智行事，抑或伊朗是一個不同凡響的險惡國度，在會談室裏智勝了美國及其火伴。
奧巴馬的協定極可能得到經由過程。該協定只要分離得到參眾兩院三分之一議員(34名商討員和145名眾議員)的支撐，就不怕受到反對。但是即使如斯，它也不是板上釘釘的工作。將來60天時代，它還將面對以色列、沙特阿拉伯和每一名共和黨總統候選人競爭者的進擊。除以天下末日的透鏡對待伊朗以外，這些人還各自有別的念頭願望該協定短命。
沙特方面的邏輯很簡略。伊朗是沙特的重要競爭敵手，號稱代表該地域的什葉派少數人群(個中一大部門生存在沙特盛產煤油的東部省分)。在一場宗派辯論的零和遊戲中，任何有益於伊朗的工作都是壞事。
以色列的否決也刀切斧砍。作為中東地域獨一具有核兵器的國度(只管沒有宣布)，以色列願望堅持其把持位置。以色列人表現，核協定將讓伊朗獲得充足裂變資料的時光從兩個月倒退至一年，這一點給人一種虛偽的撫慰。另外一方面，讓一個被擯棄的國度從新進入國際社會，將以某種方法進步該國終極具有核兵器的概率。
末了，共和黨人以為奧巴馬是一個不賣力任的總統，他與一個恐懼主義國度會談，這件事自己就會危及美國氣力。協定質量是無關的。除政權更叠，別的辦理計劃都不可。這些念頭中有些是堆疊的。比方，以色列總理本雅明蔠呑尼亞胡(Benjamin Netanyahu)和共和黨人同樣對奧巴馬抱有小我敵意。讓他們站到一路的緣故原由是，他們都謝絕以為伊朗會轉變。
奧巴馬卻采用分歧的計謀。一位務實的會談者擅長從敵手的視角對待題目。伊朗題目的出發點是，該國成長核兵器的設法主意是完整理性的。在曩昔15年裏，以美國為首的友邦入侵了伊朗的兩個隔壁——伊拉克和阿富汗。美軍軍隊如今仍駐紮在這兩個國度。一樣平常說來，美國不會入侵具有核兵器的國度。別的，2002年合法德黑蘭願望在阿富汗贊助美國之際——伊朗也對塔利班抱有敵意(如今還是如斯)——美國卻將伊朗貼上“險惡軸心”的標簽。時任伊朗總統的平和派神職職員穆罕默德哈塔米(Mohammad Khatami)也表示稱，有大概簽訂核協定。假如其時美國總統喬治·W·布什(George W Bush)做出回應，將會獲得一份比如今好很多的協定。成果布什卻將伊朗歸入險惡國度之列。其實不使人不測的是，德黑蘭加速了其機密研發核兵器的盡力。
其次，伊朗決議棄捐核野心以調換經濟制裁的消除也是理性的。伊朗不太大概隨意馬虎廢棄本身的核籌劃。它采用此舉以前，以美國為首的國際社會實行了10年制裁，令伊朗經濟墮入癱瘓。最高引導人阿亞圖拉阿裏哈梅內伊(Ayatollah Ali Khamenei)的政權明顯以為，棄捐核野心有助於增長政權的生計機遇。
正如奧巴馬的批駁者所猜測，伊朗大概會用估量有1000億美元的解凍資產的很大一部門贊助地域署理人，特別是真主黨。但這又若何?與“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯蘭國”(ISIS)及其模擬者比擬，真主黨算是一支抑制的力氣。真主黨的宗教系統是獨裁主義，該構造曾動員過恐懼打擊，但並非一個滅亡邪教構造。在一個只有糟選取的天下，對付一份能耽誤(且有大概清除)中東核武備比賽隱患的協定，晉升真主黨的影響力是一個可以接收的價值。
這些來由都不克不及說服奧巴馬的批駁者，但他的毀謗者們也拿不出實際可行的替換計劃。多名共和黨總統候選人競爭者許諾，上任“第一天”就要撤消伊朗核協定。交際規則象征著奧巴馬不克不及指出，比起沙特阿拉伯，伊朗更有願望產生寧靜變更。與沙特分歧，伊朗具有一個準民主體系體例，約一半的大學卒業生是女性。伊朗的神權政權內部存在著互相競爭的權利中間，很輕易想象進一步放松的遠景。與此構成比較的是，沙特王室基礎軟弱，誰曉得代替它的會是甚麽?伊朗是沙特阿拉伯瓦哈比(Wahhabi)神權政治的自然對抗。作為非阿拉伯國度，伊朗沒法主宰中東。別的，別忘了另有若何擊敗伊斯蘭國的“小”題目。沒有伊朗的贊助，美國將墮入更糟的逆境。
在汗青長河的某些關鍵，美國總統冒險轉變眾人熟知的天下格式。羅納德裏根(Ronald Reagan)與米哈伊爾戈爾巴喬夫(Mikhail Gorbachev)的友情是一例，理查德尼克松(Richard Nixon)向中國開放又是一例。奧巴馬與伊朗殺青協定之舉是近乎一樣巨大的手筆。
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