How times change in China. Or maybe not. This yearthe People’s Bank of China replaced its monthly loanquota system with a new procedure — its MacroPrudential Assessment to monitor credit growth.
中國的變更多快啊。嗯，大概沒怎樣轉變。本年，中國央行(PBoC)用新的流程——宏觀謹慎評估系統(MacroPrudential Assessment)——代替了月度貸款配額機制，以監測信貸增加。
The change comes at a time when once again theflow of total credit is being ratcheted up, both fromthe banks and the non-banks in an effort to support economic expansion.
此舉出台之際，中國總的信貸資金流(源自銀行和非銀行類機構)範圍再次加大，以求支撐經濟擴大。
Between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the end of the third quarter of last year, non-financialsector debt swelled 279 per cent and now amounts to 249 per cent of gross domestic product,data from the Bank for International Settlements show. Those numbers do not capture thejump in credit in recent months. China’s banks are meant to do their national service in avariety of ways — and never mind their obligations to minority shareholders.
國際清理銀行(Bank for International Settlements)的數據表現，2008年第四時度至客歲第三季度末時代，非金融部分的債務擴展了279%，現在相稱於海內臨盆總值(GDP)的249%。這些數據並未計入比來幾個月信貸的激增。中國各銀行存在的目標便是以各類方法辦事於國度——對少數股東的責任就別提了。
As Chris Wood, at Citic Securities, notes, recent talk of the banks converting part of their debtsinto the equity of their weaker corporate clients points to the “political reality that theinterests of the banks could be subordinated to the interests of the real economy — apotential negative for shareholders in Chinese banks”.
正如中信證券(Citic Securities)的克裏斯•伍德(Chris Wood)所指出的，近期有關銀行把它們對較疲弱企業客戶的部門債權轉換為股權的談吐，註解了“如許一個政治實際：銀行的好處大概會屈服於實體經濟的好處，這對中資銀行的股東多是個壞新聞”。
It also suggests that another distressed debt cycle looms.
這也預示著又一個不良債務周期將要開啟。
There have already been seven corporate defaults this year, with more likely. Credit spreadshave widened as a result, which means that after a rush of issuance, the bond market may notbe as kind to issuers, Mr Wood adds.
本年已產生了七起企業違約，還大概產生更多違約事宜。伍德彌補說，這已致使信貸息差擴展，象征著在閱歷一輪債券刊行高潮以後，債券市場對刊行人大概再也不像曩昔那樣友愛。
Many bold foreign investors are starting to consider the opportunity either in buying up loanportfolios, or in extending rescue financing to those sectors where the banks are forbiddento lend. Options include offering funds to property developers to buy new land banks, andtaking as collateral existing projects.
很多勇敢的外國投資者正在開端斟酌兩方面的機會：一是買進貸款組合，二是向銀行被制止放款的那些部分供給搭救資金。他們的選項包含向房地產開辟商供給買入新的地盤貯備的資金，並接收現有項目作為典質品。
In April, Huarong and Cinda , the asset management arms of ICBC and Cinda respectively setup by Beijing to help clean up bad loans, reported strong earnings, particularly in theirdistressed debt businesses, with annualised yields of about 12 per cent on restructured loansand returns of more than 20 per cent on disposed assets, CreditSights, the fixed incomeresearch boutique says. The combined purchase of distressed debt assets amounted to almostRmb400bn ($61.4bn) in 2015, up 31 per cent from 2014, with sellers including non-financialinstitutions and banks.
牢固收益研討機構CreditSights表現，本年4月，中國當局為了贊助清算不良貸款而設立的資產治理公司——華融(Huarong)和信達(Cinda)報出強勁的紅利增加，特別是在不良債權營業上，重組貸款的年化收益約為12%，處理資產的回報率跨越20%。2015年不良債權資產的總收購範圍到達近4000億元國民幣(合614億美元)，比2014年上升了31%;賣家包含多家非金融機談判銀行。
Much of that activity came from restructuring property debt, CreditSights adds. While thisshows there is opportunity, it is not clear whether that extends to outsiders.
CreditSights彌補說，這些營業運動有很大一部門來自對地產債務的重組。只管這表現該範疇存在機會，但這些機會會不會向局外人開放還是一個題目。
Since Guangdong International Trust and Investment defaulted in 1998 — becoming the firstformal bankruptcy of a big Chinese financial institution after its failure to repay a $120m loanto a foreign lender — foreigners have ventured into this treacherous turf with caution.
1998年，在未能向一家外資銀行償付1.2億美元的貸款後，廣東國際信任投資公司(GuangdongInternational Trust and Investment Corp)成為中國首家正式停業的大型金融機構。自那次違約以來，外國投資者在進入這個傷害的範疇時膽小如鼠。
There is a belief that China lacks a level playing field, that few transactions occur at marketprices and that there is not a clear rule of law, although bankruptcy processes are moretransparent. Moreover, it is not obvious whether this cycle will be more or less virulent thanthe last one.
有一種概念以為，中國缺乏公正的競技場，險些沒有以市場價殺青的生意業務，也不存在明白的法治——只管停業流程的透明度進步了。別的，下一個周期的緊張性是不是會跨越上一個也還沒有晴明。
Huarong’s performance was based on disposals from the last cycle, leading CreditSights towonder how sustainable such results are, given the structural slowdown, the painful progress inreforming state-owned enterprises and in cutting chronic overcapacity in numerous sectors.Many of the problem assets come from the heartland of China, an area that stretches from therust belt in the north-east to the mines of Shanxi in the interior. Industrial profits haveimproved. But a big part of that improvement comes from activities separate to the corebusiness of industrial companies and investment income, JPMorgan says.
華融的事跡樹立在上一輪債務周期不良資產的處理之上，這令CreditSights忖度：斟酌到構造性放緩、改造國企和減少諸多部分歷久多余產能的苦楚進程，如許的事跡可連續性若何?很多題目資產來自中國的傳統產業要地本地，從東北的“銹帶”老產業區延長至要地本地山西省的煤礦。摩根大通(JPMorgan)表現，固然產業利潤最近有所進步，然則這一進步有很大一部門來自產業企業焦點營業之外的運動和投資收入。
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