Samuel Johnson called it the vanity of human wishes, and Buddhists talk about the endless cycle of desire. Social psychologists say we get trapped on a hedonic treadmill. What they all mean is that we wish, plan and work for things that we think will make us happy, but when we finally get them, we aren't nearly as happy as we thought we'd be.
Summer makes this particularly vivid. All through the busy winter I longed and planned and saved for my current vacation. I daydreamed about peaceful summer days in this beautiful village by the Thames with nothing to do but write. Sure enough, the first walk down the towpath was sheer ecstasy -- but by the fifth, it was just another walk. The long English evenings hang heavy, and the damned book I'm writing comes along no more easily than it did in December.
This looks like yet another example of human irrationality. But the economist Arthur Robson has an interesting evolutionary explanation. Evolution faces what economists call a principal-agent problem. Evolution is the principal, trying to get organisms (its agents) to increase their fitness. But how can it get those dumb animals to act in accordance with this plan? (This anthropomorphic language is just a metaphor, of course -- a way of saying that the fitter organisms are more likely to survive and reproduce. Evolution doesn't have intentions.)
For simple organisms like slugs, evolution can build in exactly the right motivations (move toward food and away from light). But it is harder with a complicated, cognitive organism like us. We act by imagining many alternative futures and deciding among them. Our motivational system has to be designed so that we do this in a way that tends to improve our fitness.
Suppose I am facing a decision between two alternative futures. I can stay where I am or go on to the next valley where the river is a bit purer, the meadows a bit greener and the food a bit better. My motivational system ensures that when I imagine the objectively better future it looks really great, far better than all the other options -- I'll be so happy! So I pack up and move. From evolution's perspective that is all to the good: My fitness has increased.
But now suppose that I have actually already made the decision. I am in the next valley. It does me no additional good to continue admiring the river, savoring the green of the meadow and the taste of the fruit. I acted, I have gotten the benefit, and feeling happy now is, from evolution's perspective, just a superfluous luxury.
Wanting to be happy and imagining the happy future made me act in a way that really did make me better off; feeling happy now doesn't help. To keep increasing my fitness, I should now imagine the next potential source of happiness that will help me to make the next decision. (Doesn't that tree just over the next hill have even better fruit?)
It is as if every time we make a decision that actually makes us better off, evolution resets our happiness meter to zero. That prods us to decide to take the next action, which will make us even better off -- but no happier.
Of course, I care about what I want, not what evolution wants. But what do I want? Should I try to be better off objectively even if I don't feel any happier? After all, the Thames really is beautiful, the meadows are green, the food -- well, it's better in England than it used to be. And the book really is getting done.
Or would it be better to defy evolution, step off the treadmill of desire and ambition and just rest serenely at home in Buddhist contentment? At least we humans can derive a bit of happiness, however fleeting, from asking these questions, perhaps because the answers always seem to be just over the next hill.
塞繆爾•約翰遜(Samuel Johnson)稱之為人生願望的虛幻，釋教徒在評論辯論願望的循環，社會意理學家則說，咱們被困在一架“快活水車”上。他們的意思都是說，咱們以為本身會因得到某些器械而快活，因而咱們向往這些器械，並為之計劃和盡力，但當咱們終極獲得這些器械時，卻遠不如當初想象的那末快活。
對我來講，這一點在本年夏日獲得非常活潑的印證。在全部忙碌的冬日，我一向等待這個假期，而且在做籌劃和存錢。我理想在安靜的夏季待在泰晤士河(Thames)沿岸這座俏麗的村落裏，除寫作甚麽也不做。固然了，第一次沿著河畔纖道散步時絕對有種驚喜若狂的感到──但到了第五次，就釀成稀松平凡的漫步了。英國漫長的夜晚無聊透頂，而我手頭這本活該的謄寫起來其實不比客歲12月的時刻簡略。
這看起來像是解釋人類非理性的又一例證。但經濟學家阿瑟•羅布森(Arthur Robson)給出了一種風趣的進化論說明：進化面臨的是一個被經濟學家稱為“拜托-署理題目”的困局，進化是拜托人，它試圖加強生物體(其署理人)的順應性。但它如何能力讓那些愚昧的動物依照這一籌劃行事呢?(固然，這類擬人化的說話只是個隱喻──借此解釋順應性較強的生物體更容易生計和繁衍。進化自己是沒故意誌的。)
對蛞蝓這類簡略的生物體來講，進化可認為他們置入準確的念頭(向食品挪動，並闊別光芒)，但對付咱們人類如許龐雜的、有認知才能的生物體來講則比擬難。咱們會假想很多種將來的選取計劃，從中做出選取，繼而采用行為。咱們的念頭體系必需經由計劃，使咱們能以偏向於加強順應性的方法行為。
假如我要在將來兩種選取中做出一項選取。我可以逗留在原地，也能夠持續前去下一個河水更清一點兒、草坪更綠一點兒、食品更厚味一點兒的山谷。我的念頭體系確保當我想象客觀上更好的將來時，會感到這類選取很棒，比其他全部選取都要棒很多──我會異常快活!因而我整理起行囊向前走。從進化的角度來看，這統統都是向好的：我的順應性加強了。
但如今假如我現實上已做出了決議。我已到了下一個山谷。持續欣賞河水、觀賞綠草、品味生果並不克不及讓我得到更多好處。我已采用了行為並從中獲益，如今從進化角度來講，感到快活只是過剩的奢靡。
願望得到快活和想象快活的將來讓我采用了確切能讓我際遇改良的行為;而如今感到快活則無助於改良際遇。要持續加強順應性，我如今應當想象能贊助我做出下一個決議的新的潛伏快活源泉。(下一座山的樹上是否是有更好吃的生果?)
仿佛咱們每次做出一個真正能改良處境的決議時，進化就會把咱們的快活計量儀歸零。這會匆匆使咱們決議采用下一次行為，會進一步改良咱們的際遇──但不會讓咱們更快活。
固然，我在意的是我要甚麽，而不是進化要甚麽。但我想要甚麽呢?我是不是應當盡力改良本身的客觀處境，即使我其實不會覺得更快活?究竟，泰晤士河真的很美，草坪很綠，吃的嘛──英國菜比曩昔好吃了。我的書也寫得差未幾了。
大概，假如咱們對抗進化，跳下願望和大誌的水車，只是帶著佛家滿足的心情，在家中悄悄地歇息會不會更好呢?最少，咱們人類可以或許從提出這些題目中得到一點快活(無論這快活是何等短暫)，大概是由於謎底仿佛永久鄙人一座山上。
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