Hisao Tanaka, Toshiba’s chief executive, gave a 15-second bow on Tuesday as he resigned over a $1.2bn accounting scandal. Mr Tanaka and seven other executives took responsibility for deceptions that started in 2008. Taro Aso, Japan’s finance minister, warned that this could “lose the market’s trust”.
Mr Aso is right that the debacle at one of Japan’s leading industrial conglomerates, on paper a leader in corporate governance reform, is serious. Together with the $1.7bn fraud exposed by Olympus’s chief executive Michael Woodford in 2011, it suggests that Japanese companies are prone to manipulating their accounts. But foreign investors should not give up and go home.
The reverse is true. Here is an opportunity — whether to short shares in companies that will be struck by scandal next, to buy those that will be forced to change their ways, or to do both these things in turn. Japan is an imperfect market and its slow, bumpy, yet inexorable progress towards cleaning up its corporate act provides a target.
Japan is not unique in any of this, despite a succession of scandals over the past two decades at Yamaichi Securities, Kanebo Nikko Cordial, Livedoor and others. The US was a pioneer with Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s, and companies in many countries understate losses, misprice contracts and overstate revenues.
Managers at US or European companies will also groan in sympathy at the pressure Toshiba’s executives felt when faced with “challenges” from their head office to squeeze out higher profits at results season. At Toshiba, they responded by cooking the books, helping the bosses to hide the damage done by the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 Fukushima earthquake.
The difference in Japan is that losses get handed down across generations, hidden on behalf of previous bosses. There is no such thing as the kitchen sink— the grand writing-off of underperforming divisions and old problems by a new chief executive, publicly ditching the errors of his or her predecessors instead of inheriting the burden.
The first thing Norio Sasaki should have done when he became Toshiba’s chief executive in 2009 was expose his predecessor, Atsutoshi Nishida, under whom the deception started. After all, the two were rivals, disliked each other, and even squabbled at a 2013 press conference to announce that Mr Sasaki was stepping down to become vice-chair. LINK TO SQUABBLING?
But even with a motive, a weapon, and an opportunity, Mr Sasaki refused to wield the knife, instead taking on and expanding the deception. One obstacle was that Mr Nishida had become chairman and was looking over his shoulder — in Japan, the old boss never quite departs. Mr Nishida was an adviser to Toshiba and Mr Sasaki a senior figure on its board until this week.
Japanese companies also prize loyalty and social cohesion. “There are life-long relationships between superiors and juniors. You often place your loyalty for the whole of your career with the person who showed you around when you first entered the company,” says Simon Wong, a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics.
As a result, many of the corporate governance reforms encouraged by Shinzo Abe’s government are adopted more in theory than in practice. These include the hoped-for shift from boards being inwardly-turned management committees to bodies on which outside directors play a significant role in strategic decisions, executive appointments and financial oversight.
Toshiba is a prime example. It is a blue-chip, bigger and more significant than Olympus, and was regarded as a reform pioneer, appointing independent directors in 2001 and forming board committees, including its easily deceived audit committee, in 2003. But two of the four outsiders were former diplomats, lacking financial expertise, and little really changed.
The government seeks reform to attract investment and boost growth. But the corporate code introduced in June betrays Japan’s ambiguity — and the doubts of traditionalists such as the Keidanren business federation — about empowering boards.
The code includes an assurance to managers that it “does not place excessive emphasis on avoiding or limiting risk, or the prevention of corporate scandals,” and asks only for companies to appoint “at least two” independent directors. Japan needs to be tougher than that to counter scandals such as those at Olympus and Toshiba.
東芝公司(Toshiba)社長田中久雄(Hisao Tanaka)周二因12億美元的管帳醜聞引咎告退時鞠躬15秒表現悔過。他和其他7名高管為始於2008年的誘騙行動承當了義務。日本財務大臣麻生太郎(Taro Aso)告誡稱，這大概“損失市場的信賴”。
麻生太郎說得沒錯，作為日本重要的產業團體之一，東芝產生的醜聞很緊張——東芝名義上照樣企業管理改造的領軍者。加之2011年奧林巴斯(Olympus)首席履行官邁克爾伍德福德(Michael Woodford)暴光的17億美元訛詐，這註解日本公司很輕易把持賬目。但外國投資者不該廢棄而打道回府。
恰好相反，這是一個機遇——不管是做空接下來將遭遇醜聞襲擊的公司，照樣購置那些被迫轉變幹事方法的公司的股票，大概挨次采用這兩種計謀。日本是一個不完善的市場，它在清算企業行動方面遲緩、曲折但弗成阻攔的過程供給了投資目的。
日本絕非獨一暴發管帳把持醜聞的國度，只管在曩昔20年裏，山一證券(Yamaichi Securities)、嘉娜寶(Kanebo)、日興證券(Nikko Cordial)、活氣門(Livedoor)和其他公司連續暴發了醜聞。美國在本世紀初率先曝出平安(Enron)和世通(WorldCom)的醜聞，很多國度的公司低報吃虧，虛報條約金額並誇張收入。
在財報季，東芝高管們面臨總部請求擠出更多利潤的“挑釁”而覺得的壓力，美國或歐洲公司的司理們也會感同身受。在東芝，他們的對策是掩飾報表，贊助老板隱蔽2008年金融危急和2011年福島地動釀成的喪失。
日本的分歧在於，吃虧一代代往下傳，後繼者幫前任老板隱蔽吃虧。日本沒有“廚房水槽”之類的器械——即新任首席履行官大肆清算表示欠佳部分和老題目，公然解脫其前任的毛病，而不是繼續這些累贅。
在2009年出任社長的時刻，佐佐木則夫(Norio Sasaki)本應做的第一件事是暴光開端誘騙行動的前任西田厚聰(Atsutoshi Nishida)。究竟，這兩人是競爭敵手，相互憎惡對方，乃至在2013年宣告佐佐木則夫離任社長、擔負副董事長的一場記者接待會上還產生了辯論。
但即使有念頭、有兵器也有機遇，佐佐木則夫照樣謝絕拿起刀，而是接過並擴展了誘騙行動。一個停滯是，西田厚聰已是董事長，存眷著佐佐木則夫的一舉一動——在日本，昔日老板歷來不會完整分開。直至本周前西田厚聰照樣東芝的一位參謀，而佐佐木則夫是副董事長。
日本公司也看重忠實和社會凝集力。倫敦政治經濟學院(London School of Economics)拜訪學者西蒙謠(Simon Wong)表現：“左右級之間存在平生的幹系。你每每會在全部職業平生中，對誰人在你剛進公司時帶你熟習情形的人堅持忠實。”
是以，安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)當局勉勵的許多公司管理改造，更可能是在理論上獲得采用，沒有落實。個中包含備受等待的改造：董事會從存眷內部的治理委員會，釀成外部董事在計謀決議計劃、行政錄用和財政監視方面施展主要感化的機構。
東芝是一個最佳的例子。它是一只藍籌股，範圍和主要性都跨越奧林巴斯，並且被視為改造前鋒，該公司在2001年錄用自力董事，並在2003年景立了董事會委員會，包含隨意馬虎受愚的審計委員會。但在4名外部董事中，有兩名是交際官，缺少財政技巧，現實上險些甚麽都沒轉變。
日本當局推進改造是為了吸引投資並推進增加。但本年6月公布的公司管理律例裸露了日本在付與董事會權利方面的曖昧不清，和日本經濟集團結合會(Keidanren)等傳統人士的質疑。
律例中有一條向治理者包管，“不會過火誇大防止或掌握危害，大概防備公司醜聞，”同時只請求公司錄用“最少兩名”自力董事。日本須要采用更倔強的做法，反抗奧林巴斯和東芝這種醜聞。
市場價：HK$ 110
