9月22日口譯文章：若何應答移民帶來的兩難
比來那些災黎掙紮著翻越斷絕圍欄、湧入歐洲的照片有力地提示了咱們全球生齒活動範圍之偉大(假如這類提示有需要的話)。最新的環球移民官方數據表現出，環球生齒中活動生齒比例湧現顯著上升。這一比例從1960年至1990年紀十年間的2.5%上下上升至2013年的3.2%，並且活動生齒絕對人數已增至2.315億。對付有吸引力的目標地國度來講，總生齒組成中出身於外國的生齒比例已遠高於曩昔(依據具備國際可比性的結合國數據：瑞典為15.9%、美國14.3%、英國12.4%、德國11.9%)。
大範圍移民並非甚麽新穎事。19世紀末20世紀初，大批生齒從“舊天下”遷移到“新天下”。在那以前，來自非洲的仆從轉變了加勒比海地域及美國的生齒組成。再加之亞洲規模內的生齒遷移(好比從中國東北到日本)，環球活動生齒總數在上世紀20年月到達了峰值。一戰後歐洲及亞洲的動蕩局面一樣帶來了更大範圍的生齒活動，人們願望在新之處開端新的生存。
但是，一樣不別致的是這些移民帶來的政治、文化上的重要幹系。由於不言而喻的各類緣故原由，實現夾雜(最少)須要一代人時光。假如當地住民直接遭到了外來移民的影響、大概沒有遭到影響但畏懼後者，他們不會迎接移民的到來——民調證據表現，在外來移民起碼的地域，住民對否決移民的政客表示出更大的支撐。
這正在造成一種嚴格的政策兩難，據報導這一幕正在英國上演，表示為各部大臣之間的辯論。政治上要做的是限定或削減外來移民的數目;經濟上則相反。大範圍移民的經濟效果平日取決於情況，但對英國來講，最新的證據是，移民大批流入險些未對當地住民在勞動力市場造成晦氣影響。英國就業率高，並且只有在經濟闌珊時代，才會湧現對低收入人群人為發生下行壓力的跡象。
這大概令你覺得驚奇，直到你意想到，近期的移民具有與當地勞動力互補、而非競爭的技巧。這恰是基於積分的移民政策的特色;我曾辦事過5年的自力咨詢機構——移民咨詢委員會(Migration Advisory Committee)本年早些時刻更新了缺乏技巧清單。外來移民均勻而言每每比現有(老齡化)的生齒更年青，是大眾財務的凈進獻者;並且，很多都是有技巧的工人。究竟，閱歷過遷徙到一個新國度的巨變的人，多是最有勁頭和刻意的人。
是以，假如移民對英國團體經濟有甚麽影響的話，也是踴躍影響。假如不克不及引入環球勞動力的話，沒有國度能在任何市場範疇成為環球引導者。倫敦金融城的銀行與專業辦事公司、跨國公司、軟件公司和創意家當——經濟中全部的高代價增加範疇——須要多樣化、國際化的勞動力供給。高級教導須要外國留門生，後者所交膏火可以補助英國大學本科生。大眾部分須要來自東歐、南歐的護士、托兒所助手、護工及幹凈工，由於本錢壓力象征著弗成能應用進步人為來吸引(好比說)從事管帳或公關事情的住民從事此類事情。
那末，政客們該若何做能力應答這些互相辯論的壓力呢?
第一步——對經濟學家來講簡略，但對畏懼“180度大轉彎”的政客們來講難一些——是不要用沒法實現的目的砸本身的腳。英國當局“數萬凈移民”的目的明顯是永久沒法實現的。為兩個你沒法掌握的大數字的差額設定目的是一個異常糟的主張。這一目的的構造正致使愚昧的決議，如阻攔外國留門生卒業後在英國事情一段有限的時光。目的最少應當在原則上是可控的、故意義的，以是，對英國來講，這象征著從經濟緣故原由動身制訂針對非歐盟外來移民的目的。
第二類辦法須要辦理經濟驅動力題目。在這方面，大眾部分自己可以經由過程下降對便宜勞動力的依附施展很大的感化，這類依附每每間接地發生於處所政府養老付出、大概公民衛生辦事系統(NHS)護士薪水付出方面的預算壓力。人為及雇傭前提必需獲得改良，不然，對付用新移民彌補這些依附大眾付出的職位的需求只會賡續增長。
一樣主要的是要應答移民在勞動力市場以外釀成的不良效果，重要表如今晉升了對大眾辦事和住房的需求。房錢上漲，全科大夫診所擠滿了操著外語的患者，岑嶺時光公交車裏人滿為患。固然來到英國的移民是財務凈進獻者——納稅額比獲得的福利和辦事要多，但凈進獻不會進入到他們享受的辦事當中。這是英國高度會合的財務政治的成果。假如英國當局能將充足的征稅和付出的權利下放到處所政府，就能夠更易地減緩這些壓力。讓移民假寓之處政府征收少許之處花費稅大概保存本地的房地產稅收收入，並用於這些地域的黌舍、住房扶植、交通、醫療和社會福利預算。
這些辦法都弗成能讓環球及英國正在閱歷的移民活動加倍易於應答，但會明顯和緩兩難局勢的尖利性。
【參考譯文】
The recent images of refugees literally struggling over fences to get into Europe make for a powerful reminder, if it were needed, of the scale of the movement of people around the world. The latest official figures for world migration date show a clear step up in the proportion of the global population on the move. It rose from around 2.5 per cent of the total for the decades 1960-1990, to 3.2 per cent in 2013 — and the absolute number had reached 231.5m. For the attractive destination countries, the share of the total population consisting of those of foreign birth has reached much higher proportions (15.9 per cent in Sweden, 14.3 per cent in the US, 12.4 per cent in the UK and 11.9 per cent in Germany, on theinternationally comparable UN figures).
Large-scale migration is nothing new. The late 19th and early 20th century saw huge movements from the Old World to the New. Before that, African slavery transformed the populations of the Caribbean and US. Taking into account movements within Asia, too (for example from northeastern China to Manchuria and Japan), the global total peaked in the 1920s. Post-war turmoil in Europe and Asia alike brought further large movements of people hoping to build new lives in new places.
Equally, though, there is nothing new about the political and cultural tensions these migrations bring. Assimilation takes (at least) a generation, for obvious reasons. Residents dislike some of the consequences if they are directly affected by immigrant arrivals, or fear them, if they are not — polling evidence shows stronger support for anti-immigration politicians in areas where there are the fewest immigrants.
This is creating an acute policy dilemma, reportedly played out in the UK in the shape of a row between ministers. The political imperative is to limit or reduce the number of inward migrants; the economic imperative is to do the opposite. The economic consequences of large-scale immigration will always depend on the context, but the recent evidence for the UK is that the large inflows have had little adverse labour market effect on existing residents. The country’s employment rate is high, and it was only during the recession that there were signs of downward pressure on the wages of people on low pay.
This might seem surprising until you realise that the recent immigrants have skills that are complementary to the workforce in situ, rather than competing with it. This is a characteristic encouraged by the points-based migration policy; the independent Migration Advisory Committee (on which I served for five years) updated its skills shortage list earlier this year. Immigrants here have tended to be younger on average than the existing (ageing) population, net contributors to the public finances; and many are skilled workers. And, after all, it is probably the most dynamic and determined who go through the upheaval of moving to a new country.
So immigration has had, if anything, a positive impact on the aggregate UK economy. No country can be a global leader in any market if it cannot bring in a global workforce. The City’s banks and professional services firms, the multinationals, the software companies, the creative industries — all the high value growth sectors of the economy — need that raw material of a diverse and international workforce. Higher education needs foreign students, who subsidise UK undergraduates. The public sector needs nurses and nursery assistants and carers and cleaners from eastern and southern Europe because cost pressures mean it does not increase wages to attract residents from, say, accountancy or PR.
So what can politicians do to deal with the conflicting pressures?
One step — simple to an economist, harder for politicians who dread “U-turns” — would be not to shoot yourself in the foot with an unattainable target. The UK government’s “net migration in the tens of thousands” target was obviously always unattainable. It is a very bad idea to target the difference between two large numbers neither of which you can control. The structure of the target is causing stupid decisions such as preventing foreign students from working in the UK for a limited period after graduation. Targets should at least in principle be controllable and meaningful, so in the UK context that means aimed at non-EU inward migration for economic reasons.
A second kind of measure addresses the economic drivers. The public sector itself could play a large role here by reducing its reliance on cheap labour, often arising indirectly through budget pressures on local authority spending on old age care or NHS spending on nurses. Pay and employment conditions will have to improve otherwise the demand for new immigrants to fill these jobs dependent on public spending will only grow.
It is also important to deal with the adverse consequences of immigration outside the labour market, which manifest themselves in higher demand for public services and housing. Rents go up, GP surgeries are crowded with people speaking foreign languages, buses are packed full at rush hour. Although immigrants here are net financial contributors, paying more in taxes than they receive in benefits and services, that net contribution is not going into the services they use. This is a consequence of the UK’s highly centralised fiscal politics. If the government would devolve enough tax raising and spending power to local authorities, the pressures could be more easily addressed. Let the places where the immigrant settle charge a small local sales tax or keep local property tax revenue, and spend it on schools, housebuilding, transport and the health and social care budget in their area.
None of these would make the migration flows that the world and the UK are experiencing easy to deal with but they would make the dilemmas far less acute.
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