As the period of ultra-loose monetary policy in the developed world inches to a close, a paradox calls for explanation. Throughout this extraordinary monetary experiment managers of listed companies appeared to see risks everywhere and have been reluctant to invest in fixed assets despite enjoying the lowest borrowing costs in history. By contrast financial institutions have been fearless in propelling markets ever higher.
跟著蓬勃國度的超寬松泉幣政策期靠近閉幕，一個抵觸須要獲得說明。縱觀此次不平常的泉幣試驗，上市公司的治理者眼裏仿佛隨處都是危害，只管順手可得史上最低的乞貸本錢，他們卻不肯投資於牢固資產。比擬之下，金融機構卻像不要命似的賡續推高市場。
This dichotomy between subdued risk taking in the real economy and aggressive risk taking in financial markets has prompted Angel Gurría, 猀攀挀爀攀琀愀爀礀-general of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Dev-elopment, to remark that one or other of these views will be proved wrong.
實體經濟少氣無力不肯冒險，而金融市場激進冒險，這類反差匆匆使經合構造(OECD)秘書長安赫爾古裏亞(Angel Gurría)批評稱，這兩種概念必定有一種將被證實是毛病的。
With the US Federal Reserve now preparing to raise interest rates we may soon know whose judgment is dangerously flawed.
鑒於美聯儲(Fed)正預備進步利率，咱們大概很快就可以得悉哪一種斷定存在傷害的缺點。
The behaviour of financial institutions, whether judicious or insane, is at least comprehensible. Central banks’ post-crisis bond buying programmes were precisely designed to prod investors to take on more risk. This has given further impetus to a secular decline in real interest rates that predated the financial crisis, reflecting such forces as the Asian savings glut, deficient 椀渀瘀攀猀琀洀攀渀琀 in the west and adverse demographic trends. The outcome has been the much-discussed search for yield.
不論是明智照樣猖狂，金融機構的行動最少是可以懂得的。危急後央行的債券購置籌劃恰是為了鼓勵投資者承當更多危害。這進一步推進了在金融危急前已湧現的現實利率歷久下滑，反應了亞洲儲備多余、西方投資不敷和生齒構造趨向晦氣等多種力氣。成果是人們已有許多評論辯論的對收益的追趕。
Downward pressure on yields has been reinforced by a shortage of so-called safe assets. Hence a stampede into sovereign bonds with negligible or negative yields — in effect, a search for non-yield. Even after the recent upturn in yields, investors are still paying some European governments to take their money.
所謂的平安資產的缺少，加大了收益率的下行壓力。因而，投資者簇擁進入收益率眇乎小哉乃至為負值的主權債券——其實是在追趕無收益。縱然在比來收益率有所回升以後，投資者仍然要付錢讓某些歐洲國度的當局借走本身的錢。
In a speech in June Andrew Haldane, chief economist of the Bank of England, pointed out that there had been no precedent for such negative rates since the time of the Babylonians. Among the various potential explanations, Mr Haldane puts particular emphasis on the phenomenon of “dread risk”, a term used by psychologists to describe an exaggerated sense of fear and insecurity in the wake of catastrophic events.
英國央行(BoE)首席經濟學家安德魯霍爾丹(Andrew Haldane)在6月的一次發言中指出，自巴比倫時期以來，人類汗青上從未有過如許的負收益率先例。在多種大概的說明中，霍爾丹特殊誇大了“恐怖危害”(dread risk)征象，這是生理學家用來描寫災害性事宜後放大的恐怖和不平安感的術語。
It certainly provides a plausible explanation of private sector savings behaviour after 2008. Back then, households and companies were running a combined financial deficit (income less spending) of 2.4 per cent of gross domestic product in the US and 1.5 per cent in the UK, while the eurozone was running a surplus of 2.4 per cent. So the private sector was neither saving nor dissaving to any great degree.
這無疑為2008年後私營部分的儲備行動供給了一個可托的說明。2008年，美國度庭和企業的總財政赤字(收入扣除付出)占海內臨盆總值(GDP)的2.4%，在英國為1.5%，而歐元區私營部分運行著占GDP 2.4%的財政紅利。也便是說，私營部分既沒有大肆儲備，也沒有大肆花掉儲備。
By 2010 the private sector had switched to a large financial surplus of 7.2 per cent of GDP in the US, 8.2 per cent in the UK and 5.8 per cent in the eurozone. Serious thrift had set in.
到2010年，美國私營部分轉為大幅財政紅利，到達GDP的7.2%，英國和歐元區分離為8.2%和5.8%。人們認真養成為了節省習氣。
Yet there are limits to the explanatory power of dread risk. Why should a once-in-5,000-year event have struck now, rather than in the 1930s Depression, which saw far greater losses of output and employment?
但是恐怖危害的說明力有限。為何5000年一遇的事宜會產生在當下，而不是上世紀30年月的大冷落時代?當時的產出和就業喪失比如今緊張很多。
Note, too, that the dichotomy between risk perceptions in the real economy and in the financial markets is partly an illusion. Industrialists 琀梔攀洀猀攀氀瘀攀猀 are fuelling risk-taking in markets through buy-backs and 琀愀欀攀漀瘀攀爀猀.
還要留意的是，在必定水平上，實體經濟和金融市場在危害認知上的反差是一種假象。企業家本身的回購和收購助推著金融市場上的冒險偏向。
In their recent Business and Finance Outlook, OECD economists identified flawed incentive structures as part of the reason for divergent perceptions of risk. They are surely right. The growth of buy-backs stems from equity-related incentives and performance-related pay. The most popular performance metrics, earnings per share and total shareholder return, are manipulable by management. No surprise, then, that survey evidence in the US has shown that profitable investment opportunities are routinely turned down in order to meet short-term earnings targets.
在比來一期《貿易和金融瞻望》(Business and Finance Outlook)中，經合構造的經濟學家們以為，危害認知分歧的部門緣故原由在於鼓勵機制有缺點。他們無疑是準確的。回購增加源於股權鼓勵和績效薪酬機制。最風行的事跡指標(每股紅利和股東總回報)可以遭到企業治理層的把持。難怪美國的查詢拜訪成果註解，企業為了到達短時間紅利目的，常常廢棄有益可圖的投資機遇。
A different take comes from economists at the Basel-based Bank for International Settlements. For them, the people who suffer most from dread risk — though they do not use the term — are central bankers. The folk in Basel believe that low interest rates beget yet lower rates because they cause bubbles, followed by central bank bailouts. Their worry is that we risk trapping ourselves in a cycle of financial imbalances and busts. Unlike Mr Haldane, they would like to see an early return to monetary “normalisation”.
處於巴塞爾(Basel)的國際清理銀行(Bank for International Settlements)的經濟學家們提出了另外一個看法。在他們眼裏，受恐怖危害(只管他們沒有應用這個詞)影響最緊張的是央行官員。巴塞爾的這些經濟學家以為，低利率會進一步催生低利率，由於它們會引發泡沫，而泡沫決裂後央行會脫手紓困。他們的擔心是，咱們有大概墮入金融失衡和崩盤的輪回。和英國央行的霍爾丹分歧，他們願望泉幣政策及早回歸“正常化”。
This, though, would be painful. Even a modest move in the direction of historic interest rate norms could pose a threat to solvency, not least for banks whose balance sheets are stuffed with sovereign debt. The search for non-yield has made safe assets unsafe, while rock-bottom policy interest rates have restricted central bankers’ crisis management toolbox. Escaping from this once-in-5,000-year aberration may thus require Houdini-like skills.
不外，這將是苦楚的。縱然是朝著歷久利率常態的偏向邁出有分寸的一步，也大概對償付才能組成威逼，特別是對那些資產欠債表上積存大批主權債務的銀行。對無收益的追趕讓平安資產不平安，而低得不克不及再低的政策利率又限定了央行官員治理危急的手腕。是以，要從這場5000年一遇的變態局勢脫身，須要把戲巨匠霍迪尼(Houdini)那樣的高明技能。
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