The pilgrimage of Greek prime minister AlexisTsipras to Moscow told a tale of two tragedies. One,perilously close to the denouement, is aboutGreece’s uncertain place in the family of Europeannations; the other, still unfolding but with a storylinethat foretells a calamitous final act, is about thefuture not just of the euro but of Europeanintegration.
希臘總理亞歷克西斯•齊普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)這次莫斯科之行報告了兩個慘劇故事。第一個是關於希臘在歐洲國度眾人庭中一發千鈞的位置，這個慘劇眼下正傷害地走向終局;第二個慘劇不但是關於歐元、並且是關於全部歐洲一體化的將來，只管這個慘劇尚在逐步睜開，然則故事脈絡已預示了一個災害性的終局。
Predictably enough, the Greek prime minister was feted by Vladimir Putin. The Russianpresident’s revanchist aggression in Ukraine has left his regime more vulnerable than anyonein the Kremlin would dare admit. Mr Putin badly needs to weaken the EU sanctions regime.Shared Orthodox Christianity, an air of leftist nostalgia in Athens and, above all, Greece’sdesperate isolation make it an ideal target for Moscow’s strategy of divide and rule.
不出所料，這位希臘總理遭到了弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)的盛意招待。這位俄羅斯總統對烏克蘭睜開的抨擊性進擊，導致其政權軟弱到了克裏姆林宮全部人都不敢認可的田地。普京急切須要減弱歐盟的制裁政府。配合的宗教崇奉——東正教(Orthodox Christianity)，雅典氛圍中漫溢的左翼念舊主義，和最主要的——希臘今朝失望的伶仃狀況，使希臘成為了莫斯科分治之策的幻想目的。
It is harder to see what Mr Tsipras gains beyond a few warm words to cheer his supporters athome. The promise of a gas pipeline years hence? Any aid on offer from Moscow would beminuscule relative to funds from the EU and the International Monetary Fund. There is nothingMr Putin could do that would make leaving the euro any less painful.
除收到幾句暖和的問候外，很丟臉出齊普拉斯還能獲得甚麽來讓海內的支撐者愉快起來。對數年後扶植一條自然氣管道的許諾?與希臘從歐盟及國際泉幣基金構造(IMF)得到的資金比擬，莫斯科可以或許供給的任何支援都邑顯得眇乎小哉。不管普京做甚麽，也弗成能減輕希臘離開歐元區的苦楚。
The other day I heard Yanis Varoufakis explain how Greece had ended up here. The financeminister’s is a story fluently told — of US backing for the colonels, of the havoc wreaked onindustry by the free trade rules of the EU, of the Brussels funding that bankrolled clientelistpolitics in Athens and of how cheap euros created a ruinous bubble.
有一天，我聽到了亞尼斯•瓦魯法基斯(Yanis Varoufakis)說明希臘是若何落到如斯田地的。在這位希臘財長口若懸河的報告中，這是一個關於美國曩昔支撐希臘軍當局、歐盟自由商業規矩致使產業大遭搗毀、歐盟的資金贊助了雅典的卵翼政治、和便宜的歐元是若何變成撲滅性泡沫的故事。
There are elements of truth in this; and Mr Varoufakis is right when he says the present debtburden is unsustainable. Missing from the narrative, though, is any sense that Greece mustmake its own choices. That, whatever the sins of others, only Athens can decide whetherGreece prospers as a modern democracy or whether it slips back into the shadows of theBalkans.
這個中有些真正的元素;當提及今朝的債務累贅難認為繼時，瓦魯法基斯也沒錯。但是在他的論述中，涓滴沒有希臘必需本身做出選取的意思——不管他人有甚麽罪行，只有雅典人材能決議：希臘是作為一個當代民主國度繁榮富強，照樣退回到巴爾幹半島的暗影之下。
The omission, and the implicit rebuke to outsiders who do not feel bound by ballots cast byGreeks, is at the heart of what so frustrates Athens’ partners. This is not just about theGermans, even if Wolfgang Schäuble, Berlin’s finance minister, foolishly lends credibility to theidea. Mr Tsipras is isolated among fellow debtors as much as creditors. What unites them is ademand that Athens produce a plausible plan to reform the Greek state — to modernise itsadministration and politics as much as its economy. Such a plan would transform the moodof negotiations.
這類缺失、和對那些其實不以為本身遭到希臘投票約束的局外人的隱晦責備，才是如斯困擾希臘的火伴的題目焦點。受困擾的不單單是德國人，即使德國財長沃爾夫岡•朔伊布勒(Wolfgang Schäuble)愚昧地支撐這類設法主意。不管是在同命相連的債務國、照樣在債權人傍邊，齊普拉斯均遭到伶仃。讓他們聯結同等的是，他們都請求雅典出台一個可行籌劃來對希臘全部國度舉行改造——讓行政機制、政治和經濟實現當代化。如許的籌劃將會轉變全部會談的氣氛。
Mr Putin’s preference is otherwise. A collapse in Greek living standards would leave it ripe forthe coercion and subversion that are Russia’s trademarks in an effort to expand its influenceand control in southeastern Europe. The Russian president already has Hungary’s primeminister Viktor Orban in his breast pocket. His agents are working hard — exploiting Russia’senergy monopoly, buying politicians, bribing officials and taking stakes in financial institutions— to promote instability across the Balkans.
普京想要的便是另一回事了。希臘的生存程度一旦瓦解，將使之成為鉗制和推翻的適合工具——為了到達在歐洲東南部擴展影響力及增長掌握的目標，這是俄羅斯習用的手法。這位俄羅斯總統已把匈牙利的維克托•歐爾班(Viktor Orban)收入囊中。普京部下的間諜也在盡力在巴爾幹半島增長不穩固性——應用俄羅斯的能源把持、拉攏政客、行賄官員並在金融機構中投資入股。
Yet talk to finance ministers and central bankers across the rest of Europe and the mood is oneof fatalism. They will tell you that the eurozone would withstand Greece’s departure. This isnot 2008, or even 2012, they say. Governments have put in place the mechanisms to deal withcrises. Some sound as if they believe that, freed from the vicissitudes of Greek politics, the eurowould be stronger in the long run.
不外，假如跟歐洲其他國度的財長和央行行長聊聊，他們的感到是任天由命。他們會告知你，歐元區能擔當起希臘分開。他們說，現在的情況不是2008年，也不是2012年。列國當局已出台了處置危急的機制。解脫了希臘變更無常的政治，從久遠來看歐元會加倍堅挺——有些人聽起來仿佛對此篤信不疑。
In a narrow sense they may be right, though I would not bet on it. But Greece is a distortingprism. Its sequential crises have bred complacency by distracting from the profoundstructural flaws and political challenges that still imperil the euro. Making monetary union workdemands more than proficient crisis management.
從狹義上講，他們多是對的，固然我不會對此下註。然則希臘是一塊扭曲的棱鏡。其連續不斷的危急已致使了掉以輕心，由於它們疏散了人們的留意力，令人們疏忽了今朝仍舊威逼著歐元的深條理構造缺點及政治挑釁。讓泉幣同盟運轉，須要的不單單是闇練的危急治理。
Spring has seen a burst of sunshine in the European economy. The European Central Bank’squantitative easing is having an effect. Growth has picked up a little. Yet it is a delusion tothink that the euro is in Asafe harbour. Fiscal and financial union are at best half-completed, andthe political threat to the euro continues to grow.
本年春季歐洲經濟已迎來了一縷陽光。歐洲央行(ECB)的量化寬松政策正在起到感化。增加略見轉機。不外，假如就此以為歐元已抵達平安港，那只是錯覺。財務和金融同盟至多只完成為了一半，而歐元面臨的政治威逼還在連續增長。
National politicians refuse to admit the supranational imperatives of the project they arepledged to safeguard. And a return to growth rates of 1 or even 2 per cent will not be enoughto restore the euro’s legitimacy among the angry voters who are turning to populistmovements of right and left.
列國政客有責任保衛歐洲一體化，可他們拒不認可超國度的責任。增加率重回1%、乃至2%，在惱怒的選民們傍邊將不敷以規復歐元的正當性，這些人正轉向右翼和左翼民粹活動。
In 2012, European leaders defied the markets by summoning up the political resolve needed tosave the single currency. They have since lost the will to sustain it. Greece may not bring downthe euro; the existential threat lies in the more generalised failure of nerve and leadership.
2012年，歐洲引導人挑釁了市場，拿出了救濟歐元單一泉幣的需要政治刻意。自那以來，他們就落空了保持這一刻意的意願。希臘大概不會拖垮歐元;死活攸關的威逼存在於更廣泛的勇氣損失與引導失敗。
So it is, too, in the relationship with Moscow. The biggest danger to Europe comes not from theforays of Mr Putin’s rusting aircraft carrier, or his cold war-vintage nuclear bombers, or fromSoviet-style subversion in some of the darker corners of the continent.
以是，對俄羅斯幹系也是如斯。歐洲面對的最大傷害其實不來自普京那些生銹航空母艦的突襲，大概他那些暗斗時代的骨董核轟炸機，大概他在這個大洲某些更陰郁角落裏蘇聯式的推翻運動。
No, the real weakness lies in a European mindset that prefers to temporise and equivocatethan to confront Mr Putin head on. Mr Tsipras’s visit may have held up a mirror to Greece’stroubles. But it also offered a reflection of diffidence and division across Europe. If Greecedoes fall out of the euro it will also fall out of Europe. And the failure of the euro would mark thefailure of Europe. What unites these twin tragedies is the stubborn reluctance of the authorsto rewrite the endings.
不是，歐洲真實的缺點在於歐洲人的看法，他們對普京更樂意讓步遷延和曖昧其辭，而不肯正面臨抗。齊普拉斯的拜訪大概折射了希臘的貧苦，但也折射出全部歐洲的缺少自負和看法不合。假如希臘確切會在歐元區落伍，那末它也將在歐洲落伍。歐元的失敗也將標記著歐洲的失敗。這兩個慘劇的配合的地方在於，作者們果斷不肯重寫終局。
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